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I. INTRODUCTION-OBSTETRICS UNDER ATTACK
A widely acknowledged crisis exists today throughout the field of
medical practice. In recent years many physicians have been con-
* Associate Professor of Business Law, Michigan State University.
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fronted with malpractice insurance premiums that in some cases have
increased by as much as one-hundred percent or more yearly.1 An-
nual premiums of several thousand dollars are common, and some
physicians are paying more than $100,000 annually for insurance. 2
Others prefer the risk of "going bare" to paying such exorbitant rates.3
Contributing to these astronomical insurance rates is the increase in
malpractice litigation with resulting awards to successful plaintiffs.
Exacerbating the problem is a frequently adopted approach to mal-
practice suit avoidance, the ordering of more tests and procedures
than the physician believes is necessary or beneficial. While there are
other reasons for the overuse of tests, this is done largely in an at-
tempt to better assure a correct diagnosis so as to minimize the possi-
bility of a bad medical outcome or to provide a strong defense to a
malpractice claim.4 Many observers believe that this practice is one of
the main reasons for today's skyrocketing health care costs.5
In response to intense pressure to adhere to prevailing standards of
care, and in response to the recent dramatic increases in malpractice
litigation and insurance premium rates, obstetricians in the childbirth
setting frequently engage in this kind of "defensive medicine."6 This
1. Sullivan, Doctors and Insurers, N.Y. Times, Feb. 28, 1985, at B4, col. 5; Katz,
State's Doctors Begin Cutting Back Services to Reduce Legal Costs, Det. Free
Press, Aug. 4, 1985, at 14A, col. 5; McCaughan, Doctor's Fees Soar for Fewer Serv-
ices, Lansing State J., July 7, 1985, at 1E, col. 1. The average increase for sur-
veyed Michigan obstetricians in 1985 was 70%. M. Block, Professional Liability
Insurance and Obstetrical Practice 10 (1985) (survey commissioned by the Mich.
State Medical Soc'y and the Mich. Section of Am. College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists).
2. Kleinfield, The Malpractice Crunch at St Paul, N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1985, at 4F,
col. 3.
3. Omicinski, High Premiums Forcing Doctors to Drop Malpractice Insurance, Lan-
sing State J., July 7, 1985, at 6E, col. 3.
4. Altschule, Bad Law, Bad Medicine, 3 AM. J.L. & MED. 295, 296 (1977) (discussing
how doctors order such excessive tests in "self-defense"); Det. Free Press, Aug. 4,
1985, at 14A, col. 5; Blakeslee, Doctors Debate Surgery's Place in the Maternity
Ward, N.Y. Times, Mar. 24, 1985, at E24, col. 1 (discussing doctors' use of cesarean
sections to avoid law suits). But see Bernzweig, Defensive Medicine, REPORT OF
THE SECRETARY'S COMM'N ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH,
EDUC. & WELFARE app. (1973) [hereinafter cited as HEW REPORT].
5. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1985, at A18, col. 1 ("defensive medicine may inflate
medical costs by 30 percent"); Altschule, supra note 4, at 296; Nichols, Doctors
Say Suits Revise Medical Practice, Lansing State J., Nov. 11, 1985, at 8A, col. 2; J.
LIEBERMAN, THE LITIGIOUS SOCIETY 86 (1981). See also MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY:
THE CULPRIT BEHIND HEALTH CARE COSTS? (S. Altman & R. Blendon eds. 1979).
6. Malcolm, Fear of Malpractice Suits Spurring Some Doctors to Leave Obstetrics,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1985, at AIL, col. I (discussing how doctors order more tests
than medically necessary because they are legally necessary). Also, obstetricians
cite the threat of malpractice suits as the reason for the increase in the rate of
cesarean deliveries. H. MARIESKIND, AN EVALUATION OF CAESAREAN SECTION IN
THE UNITED STATES 82 (1979); Block, supra note 1, at 8.
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results in heavy reliance on obstetrical "high technology." 7 In addi-
tion to increasing health care costs, use of this technology has been
found to result in negative birth experiences ranging from an emo-
tionally unsatisfying birth to severe iatrogenics and nosocomial9 inju-
ries to the mother or infant or both.10
Few medical specialties have felt the impact of the malpractice
hysteria more than obstetrics.' 1 Constrained by a high technology
standard of care on the one hand and the law on the other, obstetri-
cians believe their alternatives are few. The problem has become so
severe for this group that more and more practitioners who either spe-
cialize in obstetrics and gynecology or family or general practice have
eliminated12 or are contemplating the elimination of1 3 the obstetrical
aspect of their practice. These physicians feel that the income and
other rewards they realize are insufficient in light of the costs in-
volved, and they fear being sued for malpractice.14 This could mean
that in the future there will be insufficient numbers of obstetricians to
meet consumer demand for obstetrical services.15
Physicians' fear of malpractice suits, combined with increasing use
of high technology obstetrical procedures, has resulted in a situation
7. In this Article the terms "high technology," "obstetrical high technology," and
"obstetrical intervention" refer to physicians' intervention in the childbirth pro-
cess. Physician intervention includes use of the following: amniocentesis, ultra-
sound, electronic fetal monitoring, amniotomy, labor-inducing hormone
injections, pain-killing drugs, forceps delivery, shaving the perineum, cesarean
section, and episiotomy.
8. An iatrogenic injury is one resulting from treatment by a physician. DORLAND'S
ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 647 (26th ed. 1981).
9. Nosocomial injuries or diseases are those that originate in a hospital. Id at 902.
10. For example, complications of cesarean deliveries include the following: future
cesarean deliveries, psychological distress, gas, infection (intrauterine cystitis,
peritonitis, abscess, gangrene, generalized sepsis), hemorrhage, adhesions, fistula,
sinuses, wound dehiscence, subsequent uterine rupture, injury to adjacent organs
(e.g., uterus, bladder, bowel), side effects of blood transfusion (e.g. hepatitis),
thromboemboli, thrombophlebetis, aspiration pneumonia, anesthesia accidents,
cardiac arrest, cerebral vascular accidents, and death. H. MARIESKIND, supra note
6, at 43-45. Possible fetal injuries resulting from the use of electronic fetal moni-
toring include potential dangers of early amniotomy (including cord prolapse, in-
fection, and increased stress due to elimination of amniotic fluid cushion),
trauma, infection, and hemorrhage. WILLIAMS OBSTERcs 359-60 (J. Pritchard &
P. MacDonald, eds. 16th ed. 1980).
11. The medical specialists currently paying the highest rates are obstetricians, sur-
geons, and anesthesiologists, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE,
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 105 (1985) [hereinafter cited as
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT]; McCaughan, supra note 1, at IE, col. 1; Malcolm, supra
note 6, at Al. Block, supra note 1, at 10, cites average 1984 premium rate for
Michigan obstetricians at $15,400, rising to $26,200 in 1985.
12. See, e.g., Malcolm, supra note 6, at Al. See also Block, supra note 1, at 5-7.
13. Block, supra note 1, at 5-7.
14. Id. at 16; State News, (East Lansing, Mich.), July 29, 1985, at 3, col. 5.
15. Block, supra note 1, at 14; State News, supra note 14, at 3, col. 5.
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where birthing women have almost no medical decisionmaking au-
thority regarding their labor and delivery. Pregnant and birthing wo-
men are virtually coerced to submit to constantly changing obstetrical
standards of care that are increasingly based on high technology
whose efficacy has not been substantiated by scientific testing. Birth-
ing women who desire the safety of physician-attended hospital births,
as most women and their families do, .6 find themselves faced with few
alternatives.
This Article investigates some of the causes of the current malprac-
tice crisis in medicine in general and obstetrics in particular. It sug-
gests steps that can be taken by courts and legislatures to resolve the
underlying problems that have given rise to a state of affairs that is
unsatisfactory both to many pregnant women, because it excludes
them from decisionmaking and leads to unnecessary injuries, and to
their physicians, because of increasing numbers of malpractice claims.
II. BACKGROUND-THE DEVELOPMENT AND SCOPE OF
THE PROBLEM
At the same time that obstetricians have faced greater numbers of
malpractice suits,' 7 the standard of care against which their actions
are measured has changed dramatically. When physicians first began
to attend births with regularity in the 1800s, there was relatively little
they could do that proved beneficial to the mother or child.18 Ironi-
cally, in the early days of obstetrical practice it appears that physi-
cians' care and hospital settings frequently led to poor results.19
Today's obstetrician, in contrast, has a wide array of techniques
and equipment available for use in pregnancy and delivery that, ac-
cording to the medical community, provide great benefits.2 0 Many of
these techniques, procedures, and equipment were developed primar-
ily to respond to women and babies in a high-risk birth situation;21
however, they have become the standard of care and are routinely
used in the normal birth setting.22 The latter practice has come under
16. Y. BRACKBILL, J. RICE & D. YOUNG, BIRTH TRAP 59 (1984); Dallek, Labor and
Delivery as a Medical Emergency, 10 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 947, 949 (1977).
17. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 11, at 105.
18. BIRTH TRAP, supra note 16, at 1. Women increasingly sought physician-attended
births after 1840, however, because physicians had the means to relieve the pain
of delivery, and because it became the fashion to do so. R. WERTz & D. WERTz,
LYING-IN: A HISTORY OF CHILDBIRTH IN AMERICA 109-19 (1977).
19. R. WERTz & D. WERTZ, supra note 18, at 119-28.
20. WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS, supra note 10.
21. Id. at 329-68; BIRTH TRAP, supra note 16, at 44.
22. WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS, supra note 10, at 329-68. This development is the result of
a lack of obstetrical training in normal birth. H. MARIESKIND, supra note 6, at 5-7.
This is also caused by physicians classifying all women as at risk or high risk. B.
KATZ ROTHMAN, GIVING BIRTH: ALTERNATIVES IN CHILDBIRTH 131-39 (1982).
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increasing scrutiny and criticism.23
In general, analysts criticize the failure to substantiate the effec-
tiveness of any of these interventions prior to their incorporation into
obstetrical protocols.24 Standard medical textbooks instruct students
that these procedures are appropriate,25 yet investigation reveals that
there have been few scientific studies to establish their benefits or doc-
ument their risks.26 More and more scholars, physicians, and birthing
women find this unacceptable.
27
The use of obstetrical high technology raises additional concerns.
A growing number of researchers contend that routine use of these
procedures is unnecessary28 and, as a result, poses needless risks to
mother and infant.29 In fact, medical intervention in the birth process
may end in serious physical iatrogenic and nosocomial injuries to both
the mother and the baby, including death and permanent disability.30
Another type of injury that may result from obstetrical interven-
tion in childbirth is interference in mother-baby bonding. In studies
published in the 1970s and 1980s, researchers documented the critical
nature of this first phase in the development of the parent-child rela-
tionship.3 ' Mothers and babies who are drugged and mothers recover-
ing from the pain and depression of a surgical delivery have much
greater difficulty bonding than those who experience immediate,
close, and prolonged contact following parturition.32 Interference
with bonding may lead to serious and sometimes lifelong problems.3 3
Risks of medical intervention in childbirth also include negative
emotional reactions. For example, severe depression in women after
23. OBsTETRIcAL INTERVENTION AND TECHNOLOGY IN THE 1980s (D. Young ed. 1983)
[hereinafter cited as OBSTETRICAL INTERVENTION]; Adams, The Use of Obstretri-
cal Procedures in the Care of Low-risk Women, 8 WOMAN & HEALTH 25 (1983);
BIRTH TRAP, supra note 16; Brody & Thompson, The Maximin Strategy in Mod-
ern Obstetrics, 12 J. FA~i. PRAC. 977, 983 (1981); Chalmers & Richards, Interven-
tion and Causal Inference in Obstetric Practice, in BENEFITs AND HAZARDS OF
THE NEW OBSTETRICs 34 (T. Chard & M. Richards eds. 1977); H. MARIESKIND,
supra note 6, at 192-96.
24. See supra sources at note 23.
25. WILLIAMs OBSTETRICS, supra note 10.
26. See supra sources at note 23.
27. S. ARMS, IMMACULATE DECEP'TION (1975); BIRTH TRAP, supra note 16.
28. See supra sources at note 23.
29. See supra sources at note 23.
30. See supra note 10 for a discussion of possible serious injuries resulting from vari-
ous medical interventions.
31. M. KLAUS & J. KENNELL, PARENT-INFANT BONDING (2d ed. 1982).
32. I& at 33-34.
33. Id. at 47-48; Rice, Maternal Infant Bonding: The Profound Long-Term Benefits of
Immediate Continuous Skin and Eye Contact At Birth, in 2 TWENTY-FIRST CEN-
TURY OBSTETRICS Now, 373 (D. Stewart & L. Stewart, eds. 1977).
1986]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
cesarean deliveries has been amply documented.34 Use of cesarean
section is acknowledged to be a valuable procedure when it is neces-
sary, but currently soaring rates of surgical deliveries35 have led a
number of observers to question how many cesarean deliveries are un-
necessary.36 Hence, a large percentage of cesarean section patients
may be suffering unnecessarily an often devastating emotional injury,
in addition to the risks of major abdominal surgery.
Heightened concern about rising health care costs and a desire to
"contain" those costs are leading to greater scrutiny of the choices
health care providers make in treatment decisions. Health care ex-
penditures have increased by 300% since 195037 and accounted for
10.8% of the Gross National Product in 1983.38 Even the untrained
observer can readily see that use of additional tests and procedures
increases the cost of health care, and that, as a result, the least costly
childbirth is one in which no medical interventions are used. As each
procedure is introduced, costs begin to clinb.39 Apart from other po-
tential benefits, a reduction of unnecessary medical intervention in
childbirth should lower health care costs.
Largely due to the use of obstetrical high technology and medical
school training (which focuses on pathology rather than wellness),40 it
can be seen that the natural physiological childbirth process has be-
come regarded as a disease condition4' and the mother and baby are
seen as patients in need of medical treatment.42 Instead of a woman
giving birth in proximity to medical attendants in the event their serv-
34. BIRTH TRAP, supra note 16, at 26; Affonso & Stichler, Exploratory Study of Wo-
men's Reaction to Having a Cesarean Birth, 5 BIRTH & FAM. J. 88 (1978).
35. Marieskind, Cesarean Section, in OBSTETRICAL INTERVENTION, supra note 23, at
183; Placek, Taffel & Moien, Cesarean Section Delivery Rates: United States,
1981, 73 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 861 (1983).
36. BIRTH TRAP, supra note 16, at 22-31; Marieskind, supra note 35, at 188-92.
37. J. GUINTHER, THE MALPRACTITIONERS 121 (1978).
38. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 11, at 96.
39. For example, an "uncomplicated" hospital birth might cost $2,239 while one in-
volving a relatively uncomplicated cesarean section delivery might run $7,500.
BIRTH TRAP, supra note 16, at 4.
40. For example, "[the emphasis on pathology in this edition] has been continued
because more than a mere acquaintance with pathology is an absolute require-
ment for the superior practice of gynecology." NOVAK'S TEXTBOOK OF GYNECOL-
OGY vii (H. Jones & G. Jones 10th ed. 1981). See also WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS,
supra note 10, which devotes approximately 600 pages to complications of preg-
nancy, 300 to anatomy and 45 to prenatal care and family planning, and in which
normal birth is presented as requiring numerous medical interventions. Id. at
405-34.
41. BIRTH TRAP, supra note 16, at 31, 47; B. KATZ ROTHMAN, supra note 22, at 37; S.
ARMS, supra note 27, at 64; Thacker & Banta, Benefits and Risks of Episiotomies,
in OBSTETRICAL INTERVENTION, supra note 23, at 164.
42. See also B. JORDAN, BIRTH IN FouR CULTURES 35 (1983) (the inclusion of preg-
nancy and childbirth in the medical realm has transformed the pregnant woman
into a "patient"); WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS, supra note 10, at 8.
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ices are needed, a "modern" birthing woman turns herself over to
health care providers who deliver the baby for her following obstetri-
cal protocols based on a high technology standard of care.43
In this setting, at a time of tremendous vulnerability, the birthing
woman has little control over the sequence and progression of events
leading to the birth of her child.44 She is made to feel guilty if she
does not docilely and unquestioningly accept each succeeding step cho-
sen by the physician.45 Thus, the pregnant woman who desires the
safety of a hospital birth finds herself with little decisionmaking au-
thority. This poses a dilemma for American women who have a strong
belief in the safety of the hospital.4 6 A laboring woman may go to the
hospital and do as she is told or she may make all of the decisions
herself and take what is perceived as the unacceptably high risk of
home birth.47
A growing number of women seek to change this situation and to
make decisions regarding the births of their children.48 These would-
be decisionmakers have encountered a formidable obstacle in the path
to shared decisionmaking-physicians' intransigence. Most physicians
are extremely reluctant to relinquish control and highly resistant to
any changes in the power alignment of the typical doctor-patient rela-
tionship as it exists today.49 Physicians themselves express a number
of reasons for this, and other observers also have been able to provide
insight.
Jay Katz, a physician-lawyer who has thoroughly investigated
shared decisionmaking through analysis of the informed consent doc-
trine,5 0 points out that physicians historically have maintained silence
on treatment and diagnosis issues because of their training.5 1 Summa-
rizing Katz's discussion, the bases for this practice rest in the beliefs
that these disclosures are "inimical to good patient care;"5 2 if the truth
were told, patients would lose faith in the physician; 3 the truth would
be injurious to the patient;54 patients owe a duty of obedience to the
43. BIRTH TRAP, supra note 16, at 1-23; WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS, supra note 10, at 405-
34.
44. B. KATZ ROTEMAN, supra note 22, at 178.
45. See generally Morrow, Women's Health Care and Informed Consent- Who
Should Decide What Is Best for Woman-Patients or Doctors?, 9 GOLDEN GATE
L. REV. 553 (1979); B. KATZ ROTmeAN, supra note 22, at 175.
46. BIRTH TRAP, supra note 16, at 58.
47. B. KATZ ROTIMAN, supra note 22, at 41-42; Dallek, supra note 16, at 948.
48. BIRTH TRAP, supra note 16, at 47, 56; B. KATz ROTHMAN, supra note 22, at 109.
49. J. KATz, THE SILENT WORLD OF DocTOR AND PATIENT 27 (1984).
50. This doctrine is discussed infra text accompanying notes 111, 151-97.
51. J. KATZ, supra note 49, at 3.
52. Id. at 2.
53. Id. at 11 (discussing a work of Samuel de Sorbiere).
54. Id. at 19 (quoting T. PERcIVAL, MEDIcAL ETHICs (1803)).
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physician;55 and conversation is reserved for convincing patients of the
correctness of the physician's chosen mode of action.5 6 Katz stresses
the failure of the physician community to consider the liberty issue
implicit in informed consent.57 Instead, the physicians' model of good
care is a paternalistic one predicated on the patient placing herself in
the "custody" of the physician.5 8 Full disclosure and shared decision-
making, then, are "alien to medical thinking and practice."59
Today, this tradition of silence continues through the training of
obstetricians. In general, physicians are taught that, due to their
greater knowledge,6O they should be in control of medical decision-
making.61 In particular, they develop an especially paternalistic atti-
tude about their female patients6 2 that precludes the possibility of
shared decisionmaking. Furthermore, physicians are trained in medi-
cal school to view childbirth as a disease process 63 that requires their
expertise and control instead of a natural event that in most cases can
proceed without medical intervention.64
Many physicians cite the fear of malpractice suits as a critical fac-
tor in their insistence on exclusive decisionmaking power and their
reliance on high technology;6 5 thus, they keep abreast of the latest
court rulings and make treatment decisions consistent with those rul-
ings.66 These court-influenced medical decisions may or may not be in
the best interests of the patient, but physicians feel themselves in-
creasingly under siege6 7 and have resorted to this type of decisionmak-
ing in order to protect themselves from adverse rulings in the event
they are sued.68 Malpractice suits are unquestionably a major prob-
lem for today's physicians, and in order to develop strategies to allevi-
ate this problem, one must consider its roots and causes.
55. J. KATz, supra note 49, at 1, 21 (quoting the American Medical Association's first
code of ethics).
56. Id. at 5-6 (discussing Plato's views on treatment of "the free and rich" patients).
57. Id. at 2.
58. Id
59. Id. at 1.
60. Id. at 26-27 (quoting the opinion of a group of senior surgeons).
61. Id. at 1-30; see generally Morrow, supra note 45, at 556; 1 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N
FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBS. IN MED. AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL
RESEARCH, MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS 129 (1982) [hereinafter cited as
MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS].
62. Morrow, supra note 45, at 556-57.
63. B. KATZ ROTHMAN, supra note 22, at 131-39.
64. R. BRADLEY, HUSBAND-COACHED CHILDBIRTH 196 (3d ed. 1981).
65. Interviews by author of Lansing obstetrician Dr. Jairam Rajan (July 17 & Sept.
28, 1984). See also Project, The Medical Malpractice Threat7 A Study of Defensive
Medicine, 1971 DUKE L.J. 939, 965 (citing negative defensive medicine as a possi-
ble adverse impact on malpractice litigation); Nichols, supra note 5 at 8A, col. 2.
66. See supra sources at note 65.
67. See supra sources at note 65.
68. See supra sources at note 65.
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Poor medical outcome is the leading cause of medical malpractice
litigation,6 9 and, therefore, is another reason physicians wish to retain
exclusive decisionmaking authority. Equipped with expertise, physi-
cians believe that they are in the best position to make choices that
will result in an optimal outcome.7 0 Satisfied customers generally do
not complain, even if an unorthodox approach or a less than optimal
procedure was used. Results are what count. Those who are unhappy
about or injured by a poor outcome do complain: they sue. Physicians
apparently believe that they can minimize the risk of a poor outcome
and a resultant lawsuit by exerting full control over medical treat-
ment decisions.
When it comes time for an injured patient to decide whether to sue,
the effect of a poor medical outcome is aggravated by the frequent
absence of a personal relationship with the attending physician. The
literature discussing the doctor-patient relationship has been written
by scholars from a number of disciplines including law, philosophy,
medicine, journalism, anthropology, and sociology. Observers with va-
ried expertise agree on what they perceive to be a key to the increase
in malpractice litigation: the very poor or nonexistent relationship be-
tween doctor and patient.7 1 In the past, many patients viewed the doc-
tor as a trusted confidante, virtually a member of the family.72 Even if
his judgment or procedure was imperfect, his failings could be for-
given and forgotten; his patients and their families were convinced
that the doctor had done the best he could and that he genuinely cared
about them.7 3 This type of relationship appears to be the exception
today.74
One can mark the change in the doctor-patient relationship at
about the time the rate of malpractice litigation began its climb in the
1950s. Today's physician-patient relationship is marked not by friend-
ship and the laying on of hands, but by its brevity. In order to make
69. J. GuINTHER, supra note 37, at 46.
70. J. KATz, supra note 49, at 26-27 (quoting the opinion of a group of senior
surgeons).
71. J. GUINTHER, supra note 37, at 115-16; D. ENOS & P. SULTAN, THE SocIOLOGY OF
HEALTH CARE 354-55 (1977); Annas, Avoiding Malpractice Through the Use of
Informed Consent, CURRENT PRoBs. PEDIATHics, Nov. 1976, at 2, 11-17; Morrow,
supra note 45, at 570-71; Pabst, A Medical Opinion Survey of Physicians' Atti-
tudes on Medical Malpractice, HEW REPORT, supra note 4, at app. 84; Peterson,
Consumers' Knowledge and Attitudes Toward Medical Malpractice, HEW RE.
PORT, supra note 4, at app. 666-67. Note, Who's Afraid of Informed Consent? An
Affirmative Approach to the Medical Malpractice Crisis, 44 BROOKLYN L. REV.
241, 248-49 (1978). For a review of the empirical studies of doctor-patient interac-
tions, see Physician-Patient Relationships in SOCIAL CONTEXTS OF HEALTH, ILL-
NESS AND PATIENT CARE 104, 109 (E. Mishler ed. 1981).
72. D. ENOS & P. SULTAN, supra note 71, at 63-64.
73. Id
74. Id See also J. LEBEiAN, supra note 5, at 90-91.
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their medical practices efficient and profitable, to treat as many pa-
tients as possible in a given period of time, physicians increasingly rely
on assistants to complete all tasks except those requiring physician ex-
ecution. 75 Ironically, physicians on the front line, who treat patients
day by day and whose training is in evaluating symptoms to arrive at a
diagnosis, seem not to have grasped this fact nor to have taken steps to
"treat" their own problem.
A problem this complex has more than one cause. In addition to
the poor quality of the relationship between many physicians and pa-
tients, which makes it easier for the patient to sue, the patient often
has high and unrealistic expectations about the potential outcome of
treatment.76 Many patients have developed an expectation of a per-
fect outcome every time. This is due, on the one hand, to a general
societal belief that modern technology can fix anything77 and, on the
other hand, to the shroud of mystery and superhuman powers in
which the medical community prefers to clothe itself.78 It appears to
be no longer acknlowedged or understood that medical science to a
large extent remains inexact and groping for answers. 79 The speciali-
zation of medical providers also plays a role in creating high patient
expectations. Patients expect a provider with more knowledge and
expertise when that provider is a specialist.8 0 It is partially for this
reason that specialists in potentially high risk areas such as neurosur-
gery, orthopedics and obstetrics are subject to greater numbers of mal-
practice suits.81
Commentators also point out that civil litigation as a whole is gen-
erally at a higher level today and correctly note that medical malprac-
tice is but one area of many which have experienced an exponential
rise in suits.82 Consumers, it appears, now understand that they have
rights on which they may sue. Beginning in the 1960s with the pro-
consumer warranties decisions,8 3 pro-tenant decisions8 4 and Ralph Na-
der's successful attack on the General Motors Corporation Corvair in
75. G. BALLETT, GETTING STARTED IN PRIVATE PRACTICE 225-28 (1978); H. COTTON,
MEDICAL PRACTICE MANAGEMENT 146-47 (1967); J. LAWSON & J. MCCONNELL,
STARTING AND MANAGING YOUR PRACTICE 93-94, 100-01 (1983).
76. J. GUINTHER, supra note 37, at 116; D. ENOS & P. SULTAN, supara note 71, at 352-53;
Brinkley, Physicians Have an Image Problem-It's Too Good, N.Y. Times, Feb.
10, 1985, at E6, col. 3.
77. See also Ubell, How Today's Surgeons Perform the Impossible, PARADE MAGA-
ZINE, Nov. 3, 1985, at 4-7.
78. J. KATZ, supra note 49, at 26-29, 45.
79. Id. at xvii.
80. J. GUINTHER, supra note 37, at 116.
81. Malcolm, supra note 6, at Al, col. 1.
82. For example, the rate of civil litigation (as measured by the number of suits filed
in federal district courts) rose 22% from 1980 to 1982. J. LIEBERMAN, supra note
5, at 5.
83. See, e.g., Browne v. Fenestra, Inc., 375 Mich. 566, 134 N.W.2d 730 (1965); Vander-
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Unsafe At Any Speed,85 consumers began to acquire legal rights. Fol-
lowing these pro-consumer court decisions, state legislatures and Con-
gress enacted a series of consumer rights statutes in the 1960s and
1970s, most prominently in the area of consumer fraud,8 6 defective
products, 87 landlord-tenant law88 and credit.8 9 The once downtrodden
and timid consumer is now able and willing to freely protest perceived
mistreatment.
A clear connection exists between the assertion of consumer rights
in the marketplace of goods and services and in the marketplace of
health care services. Since consumers have been accorded substantial
rights in their roles as consumers of goods and services, they appear to
be less willing to accept a lack of rights or mistreatment in other areas
of their lives. The skepticism they have developed in dealing with de-
fective products, landlords and financial institutions permeates their
world view.
With greater rights and more education about those rights,90 to-
day's consumers are far more likely to sue when the quality of goods
or services is not what they expected or not what they were promised.
Apparently, this consumer skepticism also colors the health con-
sumer's perception of medical services and providers. 91 Revelations
about potential dangers in birth control pills, 92 intrauterine devices9 3
mark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964);
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
84. See, e.g., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cer denied,
400 U.S. 925 (1970); Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961).
85. In his book Nader brought attention to the disproportionate number of accidents
and serious injuries caused by defective automobile design, especially in the case
of the Corvair. R. NADER, UNSAFE AT ANY SPEED (2d ed. 1972).
86. See, e.g., Michigan Consumer Protection Act, MICH. Comp. LAws ANN. §§ 445.901-
445.922 (Supp. 1985).
87. Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2083 (1982).
88. See, e.g., Michigan statutes prohibiting retaliatory evictions, MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 600.5720 (Supp. 1985); regulating landlord-tenant relationships, MICH.
CoMp. LAWs ANN. §§ 554.601-554.616 (Supp. 1985); and prohibiting certain lease
clauses, MICH. CoPip. LAWs ANN. §§ 554.631-554.641 (Supp. 1985).
89. See, e.g., Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1693(r) (1982).
90. J. GUINTHER, supra note 37, at 121. It also has been suggested, however, that
some patients' lack of education may foster the belief that poor outcomes neces-
sarily imply negligence. Annas, supra note 71, at 11.
91. BIRTH TRAP, supra note 16, at 115; B. KATZ ROTHMAN, supra note 22, at 109.
92. In his preface to a book reviewing much of the contraceptive literature, K.
Moghissi acknowledged that studies were being undertaken only after many
years of use of these products and that these products had been approved for use
based on flawed clinical trials. CONTROVERSIES IN CONTRACEPTION (K. Moghissi
ed. 1979). See also Tietze, New Estimates of Mortality Associated with Fertility
Control, 9 FAMi. PLAN. PERSP. 74 (1977); BOSTON WOMEN'S HEALTH BOOK COLLEC-
TIVE, THE NEW OUR BODIES, OURSELVES 237-47 (1984).
93. See D. EDELMAN, F. BERGER & L. KEITH, INTRAuTERINE DEVICES AND THEIR COM-
PLICATIONS (1979); THE NEW OUR BODIES, OURSELVES, supra note 92, at 249-55;
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
and the use of diethylstilbestrol (DES) to prevent miscarriages, 94
made several years after thousands of women had used (and been in-
jured by) these products, may have played a significant role in arous-
ing suspicion about other aspects of women's health care95-obstetrics,
for example. Thus, the dramatic increase in medical malpractice liti-
gation comes as no surprise to those steeped in the law and practice of
consumer rights and women's health care.
Physician incompetence is another significant aspect of the medical
malpractice crisis.9 6 Although the medical community often believes
that very few of the medical malpractice suits filed are justifiably
based on malfeasance, 97 the incompetence of physicians (and other
health care providers) has been documented.98 The injurious diagno-
sis made or treatment given by a negligent provider is actionable, and
theoretically, the provider may lose his or her license to practice as
well.
In practice, however, the medical delicensing system is an abysmal
failure.9 9 Only in the most egregious cases is a physician ever taken to
task, and even then the most likely result is an admonishment or
Comment, Physicians'Liability: The State and Insertion of a Dalkon Shield, 11
CAL. W.L. REV 347, 347-50 (1975).
94. DES is a synthetic estrogen manufactured by hundreds of drug companies and
prescribed by doctors to millions of pregnant women between the years 1947 and
1971. Use of DES by these women has been linked to the subsequent develop-
ment of cancer in the users' daughters who were exposed to the drug in utero.
See Comment, DES and a Proposed Theory of Enterprise Liability, 46 FoRDHAb
L. REV. 963, 963-64 (1978). See also THE NEW OUR BODIES, OURSELVES, supra note
92, at 496-500.
95. See generally THE NEW OUR BODIES, OURSELVES, supra note 92, esp. xiii & xviL
See also Morrow, supra note 45, at 554 (discussing how authorities concerned with
women's health care urge women to be concerned about decisions made in their
behalf because the health care system has erred seriously "in their behalf' in the
past).
96. J. GUINTHER, supra note 37, at 144-52; Katz, Bad Doctors: License to Err, Det.
Free Press, Apr. 1-8, 1984 (7-part series); Wolfe, Bergman & Silver, Medical Mal-
practice: The Need for Disciplinary Reform, Not Tort Reform 2-3, a report of
Public Citizen Health Research Group (Aug. 27,1985) (available from Public Citi-
zen Health Research Group, 2000 P. Street, N.W., Suite 708, Washington, D.C.
20036). See generally Brinkley, Should Doctors Be Given a More Thorough Exam-
ination?, N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 1985, at 10E, col. 1.
97. See, e.g., Margolik, Medical Malpractice: The Role of Lawyers, N.Y. Times, Feb.
21, 1985, at A16, col. 3. See also Barber, Why So Many Malpractice Suits?, FE-
MALE PATIENT, Aug. 1983, at 14-19. Dr. Barber believes that the malpractice crisis
has been caused by greedy lawyers. He states: "The conduct or misconduct of
malpractice lawyers is an embarrassment to the elite lawyers of integrity." I&L at
15.
98. See J. GUINTHER, supra note 37.
99. Id at 144-47; Katz, Compromise Is the Rule for Board of Medicine, Det. Free
Press, Apr. 3, 1984, at 13, col. 1; Katz, Some Watchdogs Have Little Bite, Det. Free
Press, Apr. 6, 1984, at 1A, col. 3; Wolfe, Bergman & Silver, supra note 96, at i-ii;
Brinkley, supra note 96, at 10E, col. 1.
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short suspension0oo Moreover, physicians denied the right to practice
in one state may move with ease to another where generally nothing
may be done to prevent them from practicing until they commit mal-
practice in the new state.' 0 ' The physicians themselves control these
ineffective grievance procedures, 0 2 and they seem very reluctant to
report or take strong action against a colleague. 0 3 In addition, weak
procedures and the way in which the agency and court system imple-
ment them pose significant obstacles to delicensure.10 4 As a conse-
quence, the vast majority of incompetent physicians continue to
practice. 05
III. ANALYSIS
Historically, medical malpractice as a cause of action grew out of a
breach of the contract between physician and patient.106 Alterna-
tively, an injured patient could make out a case of battery if the physi-
cian did not have consent to proceed.' 0 7 The theory of battery is
grounded in the right of the individual to be free from unwanted inva-
sions in his or her body.108 Consequently, a battery can be committed
even when the physician uses great skill and care or has not injured
the patient. 09
Where skill and care are at issue, the plaintiff's action is in negli-
gence.110 The plaintiff suing in negligence has two main arguments
available: that the physician was not practicing up to the required
standard of care11 ' or that he or she failed to obtain the patient's in-
100. Katz, Bad Doctors: Who is Watching?, Det. Free Press, Apr. 6, 1984, at 1A and
12A, cols. 1-6; Katz, Bad Doctor: What Are the Answers?, Det. Free Press, Apr. 8,
1984, at 1A, col. 3; Wolfe, Bergman & Silver, supra note 96, at 6.
101. Katz, Staying a Step Ahead, Det. Free Press, Apr. 4, 1984, at 1A, col. 4.
102. Id.
103. Id J. GUINTHER, supra note 37, at 145-46; Meisel, The Expansion of Liability for
Medical Accidents: From Negligence to Strict Liability by Way of Informed Con-
sent, 56 NEB. L. REv 51, 65 (1977); Det. Free Press, July 5, 1983, at 1A, col. 5. See
also infra note 124 and accompanying text.
104. Katz, Doctors Practice While Wheels Turn, Det. Free Press, Apr. 1, 1984, at 1A,
col. 1-5.
105. Katz, Bad Doctors: A Second Chance, Det. Free Press, Apr. 3, 1984, at 1A, col. 1 &
12A, col. 1; Katz, Bad Doctors: Who Is Watching?, supra note 100, at 12A, col. 1;
Wolfe, Bergman & Silver, supra note 96, at 2-3.
106. K. FINEBERG, J. PETERS, J. WILLSON & D. KROLL, OBSTETRICS/GYNEcoLoGY AND
THE LAW 76-82 (1984) [hereinafter cited as OBSTETRICS/GYNECLOLOGY AND THE
LAw].
107. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, LAW OF TORTS 39-40 (5th ed. 1984). See, e.g., Mohr v.
Williams, 95 Minn. 261, 104 N.W. 12 (1905).
108. W. PROSSER & IV. KEETON, supra note 106, at 39-40.
109. Id at 119.
110. Id at 185-87.
111. Id. at 189.
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formed consent.112 Conceptually, the failure to obtain informed con-
sent is a failure to live up to a standard of care that includes the notion
of communicating treatment alternatives and their risks to patients-
in theory, to permit them to exercise their own best judgment based
on the information provided by the practitioner.113 Thus, a physician
who either fails to practice up to the medical standard of care or who
fails to provide adequate information to a patient may be successfully
sued for injuries that are proved to be caused by such failure.114 To-
day battery is still available in cases where no consent was obtained 115
and in some jurisdictions is still used on the basis that the patient's
consent was not informed.116 The majority of jurisdictions, however,
prefer the use of a negligence cause of action when informed consent
is at issue.117
Both prongs of the plaintiff's negligence case provide direction to
policymakers seeking solutions to the current obstetrical malpractice
crisis. Considering first the standard of care, a review of judicial deci-
sions reveals the hesitancy of judges to interfere with the judgments
of a fellow profession.lls Courts generally have allowed the medical
profession to establish standards it deems appropriate.1 19 During liti-
gation, the proper standard of care must be proved through expert
medical testimony.12 0 This state of affairs created a severe handicap
for some plaintiffs who were unable to find experts to testify on their
behalf because of the application of the court-fashioned "locality
rule."121
A. The Physician's Standard of Care
1. The Current Locality and Specialist Rules
In the early days of malpractice litigation, the locality rule was
used in the determination of whether the quality of care provided by
112. Id. at 189-90.
113. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 781 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1064 (1972); Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 154 Cal. App. 2d
560, 578, 317 P.2d 170, 181 (1957); Meisel, The "Exceptions" to the Informed Con-
sent Doctrine: Striking a Balance Between Competing Values in Medical Deci-
sionmaking, 1979 Wis. L. REv. 413, 418-422.
114. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 790 (D.C. Cir.), cert denied, 409 U.S.
1064 (1972); Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 245-46, 502 P.2d 1, 10, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505,
515 (1972).
115. OBSTETRICS/GYNECOLOGY AND THE LAw, supra note 105, at 31-32.
116. W. PROCSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 106, at 189-90.
117. Id
118. Id. at 189. OBSTETRICS/GYNECOLOGY AND THE LAW, supra note 105, at 23; J.
KATZ, supra note 49, at 59.
119. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 106, at 189.




defendant physicians was adequate.1 2 2 This meant that the plaintiff
had to introduce expert testimony to establish the common practice of
other physicians in good standing within the same community. 23 Bet-
ter practices of physicians in nearby localities, which might have led to
a better outcome for the patient, were irrelevant to the case.124
Strict adherence to the locality rule created an insurmountable dif-
ficulty for many would-be plaintiffs. The now famous "conspiracy of
silence" made it impossible in many cases for plaintiffs to obtain the
necessary expert testimony.1 2 5 Physicians refused to testify against
their local colleagues even when they were convinced that malfea-
sance had occurred3 26 There were a number of reasons for their re-
fusal, largely rooted in their fear of reprisal. Such reprisals might
come in the form of the denial of hospital privileges, the elimination of
patient referrals and the willingness to testify against the turncoat in
future proceedings.12 7
In the 1950s, '60s and '70s courts began to move away from a strict
application of the locality rule. The first inroad came when courts ex-
panded the rule to include physicians from "the same or similar local-
ity."128 Other courts moved to include physicians from "the same
school."' ' 29 Finally, for specialists, most courts expanded the territory
of the rule to include the entire United States. 3 0 This expansion was
based on the theory that the knowledge of specialists should be sub-
stantially equivalent because of uniform certification requirements for
various specialties and continuing education requirements that force
specialists to keep abreast of the latest developments in their fields.131
Under the modern rule for specialists, the plaintiff has little diffi-
culty finding a willing medical expert witness. Across the country
more and more courts have adopted this expanded view of the locality
rule, based on the rationale stated above, in order to make it possible
122. Id.
123. Id. at 187-88. See also Waltz, The Rise and Gradual Fall of the Locality Rule in
Medical Malpractice Litigation, 18 DEPAUL L. REV. 408, 410 (1969).
124. Waltz, supra note 122, at 410-11.
125. Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 568, 317
P.2d 170, 175 (1957); Huffman v. Lindquist, 37 Cal. 2d 465, 477-78, 234 P.2d 34, 45-
46 (1951); Sampson v. Veenboer, 252 Mich. 660, 667, 234 N.W. 170, 172 (1931); O-
sTETRics/GYNECOLOGY AND THE LAW, supra note 105, at 164; Meisel, supra note
103.
126. J. GUINTHER, supra note 37, at 37-38.
127. Id. See also Det. Free Press, July 5, 1983, at 1A, col. 4 & 11A, col. 1.
128. Waltz, supra note 122, at 411-12 (emphasis added).
129. See, e.g., Karp v. Cooley, 349 F. Supp. 827,836 (S.D. Tex. 1972); Natanson v. Kline,
186 Kan. 393, 411, 350 P.2d 1093, 1107 (1960).
130. OBSTETRICS/GYNECOLOGY AND THE LAW, supra note 105, at 21-22. See, e.g., Brune
v. Belinkoff, 354 Mass. 102, 235 N.E.2d 793 (1968); Naccarato v. Grob, 384 Mich.
248, 253, 180 N.W.2d 788, 790-91 (1970).
131. OBSTmWCS/GYNEcoLoGY AND THE LAW, supra note 105, at 22.
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for plaintiffs to make a prima facie case.1 32 But the transformation of
the locality rule also has additional ramifications. As a result of the
territorial expansion of the locality rule for specialists, both physicians
and patients have open to them a greater variety of medical tech-
niques and practice styles. The specialist rule puts pressure on physi-
cians to keep abreast of changes in their specialty, but at the same
time permits them greater latitude in treatment options.
2. A Proposed Solution-The Widest Possible Community
An even more expansive view of the specialist rule or standard of
care would benefit both doctor and patient. The adoption of the wid-
est possible community within which acceptable standards could be
found would accord the fullest array of alternatives and would provide
the greatest measure of flexibility to both physicians and patients. A
larger community is likely to have within it a greater number of ap-
proaches to a particular medical problem since it embodies a greater
diversity of opinion as to appropriate treatment alternatives. At the
same time, a larger community offers more protection to practitioners
faced with malpractice claims based on alleged failure to observe the
standard of care, since adherence to a respectable minority view in the
relevant community is sufficient.33
Based on the court decisions in this area over the last thirty years,
it can be seen that change has occurred and that movement has been
toward the recognition of a larger community for purposes of estab-
lishing the proper standard of care. Yet further expansion is needed if
the twin goals of physician protection and greater diversity of alterna-
tives in medical treatment are to be achieved. Further expansion of
the relevant community to include all areas where western medicine
is practiced would, in the case of obstetrics, bring in such innovative
locations as the Netherlands, where home births are the norm and the
rate of cesarean section is relatively low134 and where infant mortality
and morbidity rates are also low.135
132. Id at 21.
133. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 106, at 187; OBSTETRIcS/GYNEcoLoGY AND
THE LAW, supra note 105, at 30.
134. In 1980, while 2 to 2.5% of U.S. births took place at home, the Netherlands' home
birth rate was about 40%. D. STEWART, THE FIVE STANDARDS FOR SAFE
CHILDBEARING 204, 223 (1981). The rate of cesarean deliveries in the Netherlands
during that year was 5%. S. SAGOv, R. FEINBLOOM, P. SPINDEL & A. BRODSKEY,
HOME BIRTH: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE TO BIRTH OUTSIDE THE HOSPITAL 26
(1984). That same year, the U.S. rate was 16.5% nationally, OBSTETRICAL INTER-
VENTION, supra note 23, at 183, and close to 25% at some U.S. institutions, H.
MARIESKIND, supra note 6, at 1.
135. For example, 1977 perinatal death rates: U.S. 14.1/1000 births, Netherlands, 9.5/




3. A Proposed Solution-Diminish Physician Control over
Standard of Care
Policymakers desiring to give a greater share of control to birthing
women, while at the same time protecting physicians from suit, could
take a greater hand in determining the standard of care. Policymak-
ers should be encouraged by Justice Holmes' declaration (in a non-
medical case) that "[w]hat usually is done may be evidence of what
ought to be done, but what ought to be done is fixed by a standard of
reasonable prudence, whether it usually is complied with or not."136
Justice Holmes and Judge Hand37 recognized the problem inherent
in allowing any group to establish its own standards: the standards
may provide inadequate protection to those whom they are supposed
to protect. 3 8
Realistically, judicial or legislative alteration of medical standards
will happen slowly, if at all, given the deference that traditionally has
been shown to the judgment of the medical community regarding the
establishment of treatment standards.I3 9 This deference has not been
the rule in other areas of endeavor, however, such as products liabil-
ity.140 Court scrutiny of manufacturing standards in products liability
cases could serve as precedent for the action proposed here. Courts in
product liability cases have been quick to hold that while industry
practice is a relevant factor, judicial acceptance of those practices
without scrutiny would be a dereliction of duty.141
The same argument should be made for medicine. It was success-
ful in one case, Helling v. Carey.142 In that case the Washington
Supreme Court, sitting en banc, was convinced that the physicians'
failure to conduct a simple and inexpensive test that would have pre-
vented the plaintiff's blindness presented a clear case of an inadequate
standard of care set by the medical community.143 On that basis the
136. Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Behymer, 189 U.S. 468, 470 (1903) (citing Wabash Ry. Co.
v. McDaniels, 107 U.S. 454 (1882)).
137. See irfra note 144 and accompanying text.
138. See also Lundahl v. Rockford Mem. Hosp. Ass'n, 93 Ill. App. 2d 461, 235 N.E.2d
671 (M1. App. Ct. 1968); Favalora v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 144 So. 2d 544 (La.
Ct. App. 1962); Toth v. Community Hosp., 22 N.Y.2d 255, 239 N.E.2d 368 (1968);
Morgan v. Sheppard, 91 Oh. L. Abs. 579,188 N.E.2d 808 (Oh. Ct. App. 1963); Incol-
lingo v. Ewing, 444 Pa. 263, 282 A.2d 206 (1971).
139. See supra notes 7-18 and accompanying text.
140. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 106, at 194-95.
141. See, e.g., Marietta v. Cliffs Ridge, Inc., 20 Mich. App. 449, 174 N.W.2d 164 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1970); Tite v. Omaha Coliseum Corp., 144 Neb. 22, 12 N.W.2d 90 (1943);
Shafer v. H.B. Thomas Co., 53 N.J. Super. 19,146 A.2d 483 (App. Div. 1958); Maize
v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 352 Pa. 51, 41 A.2d 850 (1945); Pan Am. Petroleum Corp. v.
Like, 381 P.2d 70 (Wyo. 1963).
142. 83 Wash. 2d 514, 519 P.2d 981 (1974). This case was reversed in 1975 by action of
the Washington legislature. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 4.24.290 (Supp. 1986).
143. Helling v. Carey, 83 Wash. 2d 514, 518-19, 519 P.2d 981, 983 (1974).
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court declared a new standard as a matter of law.44
In 1932, Judge Learned Hand (in a non-medical case) stated that "a
whole calling may have unduly lagged in the adoption of new and
available devices. It never may set its own tests, however persuasive
be its usages. Courts must in the end say what is required .... ")45
This power has been recognized in the medical setting as demon-
strated by the Helling case;146 courts have only to exercise it. As
stated previously,147 the standards adhered to by obstetricians today
increasingly have come under attack as unwarranted, unsubstantiated
and, in some cases, injurious.148 Since the medical profession has not
yet acted on this information, perhaps now is the time for legislatures
and courts to do so by declaring an obstetrical standard of care that
takes into account recent criticism and findings that call into question
much of current obstetrical practice. At a minimum, the standard
should reestablish the distinction between the at-risk patient-the six
percent149 for whom the use of obstetrical high technology may be
outweighed by its benefits-and the low-risk majority.
B. Informed Consent
In addition, action should be taken to make the doctrine of in-
formed consent a tool to protect physicians and, at the same time, to
provide patients with access to the decisionmaking process. Although
the roots of informed consent reach back to early battery and consent
law, as an independent doctrine it is of relatively recent origin and is
still emerging and evolving in legal thinking. Further change and re-
finement, along the lines suggested below, can and should be made to
help in easing the medical malpractice crisis of the 1980s.
1. History of the Law
Informed consent sprang from the notion of consent. As discussed
earlier,150 medical treatment rendered without consent was (and still
is) considered battery.151 In an early battery case, then-Judge Cardozo
articulated the basis for the future doctrine of informed consent:
"Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to de-
144. Id. at 519, 519 P.2d at 983.
145. The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932).
146. Helling v. Carey, 83 Wash. 2d 514, 519, 519 P.2d 981, 983 (1974).
147. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
148. See supra note 23.
149. R. BRADLEY, supra note 64, at 196. The number of pregnancies placed in the
high-risk category is considerably higher (10 to 30%) in Ott, Routine Prenatal
Care and Identification of the High-Risk Patient, in HIGH-RISK PREGNANCY AND
DELIVERY 10 (F. Arias ed. 1984).




termine what shall be done with his own body... ."152 Supporters of
informed consent state that the individual's right of self-determina-
tion is fundamental to American conceptions of free will and self-
determination.153
In the 1950s courts began to move toward adopting the notion that
medical patients have the right to be informed in detail about diagno-
sis and treatment in order to permit them to share intelligently in
medical decisionmaking. In 1957, the California Supreme Court ap-
proved this philosophy, stating that "[a] physician violates his duty to
his patient and subjects himself to liability if he withholds any facts
which are necessary to form the basis of an intelligent consent by the
patient to the proposed treatment." 5 4 In 1960, the Kansas case of
Natanson v. KlinelSS sent shock waves through the medical commu-
nity by declaring unambiguously the patient's right to make an in-
formed consent' 56 and the concomitant duty of the physician to
provide sufficient information.157 Physicians continued to be pro-
tected, however, by the standard against which the sufficiency of the
provided information was to be measured. While declaring that pa-
tients had a right to information and to decide, the court in fact with-
held these rights by holding that the sufficiency of the information
provided would be measured against the standard of what a reason-
able physician would have disclosed.5s
Physicians and their insurers were again stunned in 1972 by Can-
terbury v. Spence,5 9 which established what they believed to be an
even more troublesome standard. The new standard abandoned the
152. Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914).
This idea has been quoted, paraphrased and expanded upon by courts and com-
mentators discussing the issue of informed consent. See, e.g., Canterbury v.
Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir.), cert denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972); Sard v.
Hardy, 281 Md. 432, 439, 379 A.2d 1014, 1019 (1977); Harnish v. Children's Hosp.
Medical Center, 387 Mass. 152, 155, 439 N.E.2d 240, 242 (1982); Kessenick & Man-
kin, Medical Malpractice: The Right to Be Informed, 8 U.S.F.L. REv. 261, 263
(1973); Comment, Informed Consent. Patient's Right to Comprehend, 27 How.
L.J. 975, 976 (1984); Comment, Informed Consent- From Disclosure to Patient
Participation in Medical Decisionmaking, 76 Nw. U.L. REv. 172,173 (1981) [here-
inafter cited as Patient Participation].
153. Capron, Informed Consent in Catastrophic Disease Research and Treatment, 123
U. PA. L. REV. 340, 364-76 (1974); Meisel, supra note 112, at 419-21; Note, supra
note 71, at 242; Patient Participation, supra note 151, at 174-75.
154. Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 578, 317
P.2d 170, 181 (1957).
155. 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093 (1960).
156. Id. at 403-09, 350 P.2d at 1104-06.
157. Id. at 409, 350 P.2d at 1106.
158. Id
159. 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972). See also Cobbs v.
Grant, 8 Cal.3d 229,502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972) (decided by the California
Supreme Court and relied upon by the Canterbury court in its opinion).
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reasonable physician or "professional" standard declared in Natan-
son 60 and in its place created a subjective, patient-oriented test.1 61
Nonetheless, the patient's full right of self-determination still re-
mained out of reach. The court ruled that causation must be estab-
lished with reference to whether the reasonably prudent patient in
the plaintiff's position would have gone forward with treatment,162
not whether the plaintiff would have done so.16 3 One court took that
additional step, and applied a subjective standard to the issue of causa-
tion. In Scott v. Bradford,164 the Oklahoma Supreme Court expressed
confidence that, in making its usual determinations of credibility, the
jury is capable of weighing the veracity of the plaintiff's biased hind-
sight statements. 165 The majority of courts, however, maintain the
Natanson position,166 based on a professional standard, and most legis-
latures that have acted have also adopted a restrictive approach.167
Informed consent and the right to self-determination remain un-
dermined in an American legal system that declares the existence of
these rights and then subverts them. These rights are subverted by
holdings which declare that patients have only the right to be told
what is going to happen to them before they consent and not the right
to choose from an array of options (when such options exist) with the
advice of and in consultation with the physician. As a result, due to
the current interpretation, the patient's right of self-determination is
a meager one indeed. It is subject to physician control through court-
developed tests (discussed above) and exceptions based primarily on
deference to medical community judgments (discussed below).
Many commentators who advocate informed consent because of a
belief in the right of self-determination and the benefit of preserving
160. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 783 (D.C. Cir.), cert denied, 409 U.S. 1064
(1972).
161. Id. at 785. The court stated that "[i]n our view, the patient's right of self-decision
shapes the boundaries of the duty to reveal .... The scope of the physician's
communications to the patient, then, must be measured by the patient's need, and
that need is the information material to the decision." Id. at 786.
162. Id. at 790-91.
163. Id. See also Meisel, supra note 103, at 112.
164. 606 P.2d 554 (Okla. 1979).
165. Id at 558-59. For discussions supporting this position, see Katz, Informed Con-
sent-A Fairy Tale? Law's Vision, 39 U. PIrr. L. REv. 137, 162-63 (1977), and
Meisel, supra note 103, at 112.
166. A. ROSOFF, INFORMED CONSENT: A GUIDE FOR HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS 35-36
(1981); Andrews, Informed Consent Statutes and the Decisionmaking Process, 5
J. LEGAL MED. 163, 176 (1984); Note, Medical Malpractice: A Subjective Approach
to Informed Consent in Oklahoma, 15 TULSA L.J. 665, 660 (1980); Comment, In-
formed Consent and the Material Risk Standard.- A Modest Proposal, 12 PAc. L.J.
915, 918 (1981).
167. J. KATz, supra note 49, at 81-82; Andrews, supra note 165, at 179; Meisel &
Kabnick, Informed Consent to Medical Treatment An Analysis of Recent Legis-
lation, 41 U. PITT. L. REV. 407, 423-24 (1980).
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human dignity are willing, in the medical context, to accept significant
intrusions on this right in the name of health. 6 s Presumably the good
health of the individual, because of its importance to society as a whole
(increased productivity, lower health care costs), justifies the creation
of the judicially formulated exceptions169 to the requirement of in-
formed consent.170
a. Exceptions to the Rule
Based on the general notion that good health benefits society, four
exceptions to the requirement of informed consent have been carved
out: waiver, therapeutic privilege, emergency and incompetency.171
The first exception, waiver, in a sense retains the self-determination
concept.172 The patient may simply delegate his or her power to de-
cide to the physician by stating that he or she chooses not to be in-
formed and to rely completely on the physician's judgment. 7 3
The other three exceptions give outright decisionmaking authority
to the physician. Under the therapeutic privilege exception, a physi-
cian may decide that the provision of information is not in the best
interests of the patient. 7 4 Under these circumstances, in the eyes of
the law, the physician is justified in withholding diagnosis or proposed
treatment information. 175
There is discord on the validity of this exception. Some commenta-
tors argue that the privilege expresses an unacceptable paternalism
and, as a matter of theory, should be greatly narrowed if not elimi-
nated.176 Others point out that it creates an exception capable of swal-
lowing the rule because physicians, fearful that a patient will make
168. See, eg., Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 403, 350 P.2d 1093, 1104 (1960); Harnish
v. Children's Hosp. Medical Center, 387 Mass. 152, 158, 439 N.E.2d 240, 244 (1982);
Meisel, supra note 112, at 430; Waltz & Scheuneman, Informed Consent to Ther-
apy, 64 Nw. U.L. REV. 628, 641-43 (1970); Patient Participation, supra note 151, at
176-77.
169. A number of states have placed these exceptions in statutes. See Andrews, supra
note 165, at 202-16.
170. See, e.g., Meisel, supra note 112, at 423-25.
171. These are the principal exceptions, but others have been made in some cases. For
example, the physician need not disclose a risk of which the patient is already
aware. See OBsTETRIcs/GYNECOLOGY AND THE LAw, supra note 105, at 36. In
Holt v. Nelson, 11 Wash. App. 230, 240-42, 523 P.2d 211, 218-19 (1974), the court
identified nine exceptions.
172. Meisel, supra note 112, at 453-60.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 460-70.
175. Id. at 460.
176. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 789 (D.C. Cir.), cert denied, 409 U.S. 1064
(1972); Note, Informed Consent. The Illusion of Patient Choice, 23 EMoRY L.J.
503 (1974); Patient Participation, supra note 151, at 177-78.
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the "wrong" decision and refuse treatment, will claim the privilege.177
Still other critics contend that it is counterproductive. 7 8 They call
attention to studies that they believe prove that the provision of com-
plete information to patients is highly beneficial because it prepares
them for what may happen as a result of treatment. 79 Under this
theory, the patient begins, in advance, the process of accepting possible
treatment results instead of being shocked by an outcome about which
the patient was not forewarned. An unexpected outcome is likely to
deal a severe blow to both mind and body80 and result in a malprac-
tice suit.i18
The remaining exceptions to the informed consent doctrine have
drawn less fire. Courts have uniformly supported physician treatment
without consent in emergency situations, when time is too short for
discussion. 8 2 A related exception covers circumstances in which the
patient is not competent to make decisions.S3 Again, in these cases
the societal value of good health prevails in instances when the indi-
vidual is incapable of self-determination.
b. Physicians' View of the Rule
A number of criticisms have been leveled against the existing doc-
trine of informed consent or its expansion. Physicians insist that it is a
burdensome requirement that takes valuable time away from treating
other patients.18 4 Given the poor state of the relationship that many
physicians have with their patients, and the impact of this fact on the
current level of malpractice litigation, 8 5 the legal requirement of in-
formed consent should be considered in a more positive light. It might
present an opportunity for beneficial change that could lead to a re-
duction in malpractice suits. Providing detailed information to pa-
tients through thorough give-and-take discussions in which dialogue is
genuinely encouraged, could help to establish and build a personal and
177. Meisel, supra note 103, at 100-01; MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, supra note
61, at 95.
178. Annas, supra note 71, at 17; Patient Participation, supra note 151, at 178-79.
179. Annas, supra note 71, at 12. Baudry & Wiener, Preoperative Preparation of the
Surgical Patient, 63 SURGERY 885, 885-89 (1968); Rockwell & Pepitone-Rockwell,
The Emotional Impact of Surgery and the Value of Informed Consent, 63 MED.
CLINICS N. AM. 1341, 1342 (1979).
180. Rockwell & Petitone-Rockwell, supra note 178, at 1342. See also Annas, supra
note 71, at 12.
181. Annas, supra note 71, at 12; Morrow, supra note 45, at 576-77.
182. Meisel, supra note 112, at 443-38.
183. Id. at 439-53.
184. A. RosoFF, supra note 165, at 319; Meisel, supra note 112, at 439-53; Trichter,
Informed Consent- The Patient as an Individual, 15 FORUM 455, 463 (1980); MAK-
ING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, supra note 61, at 104; Comment, Informed Consent
and the Material Risk Standard: A Modest Proposal, 12 PAC. L.J. 915, 929 (1981).
185. See supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
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trusting relationship. Several law review articles offer good sugges-
tions on the mechanics of communicating the required information.-8 6
Physicians have also expressed deep concern about what they per-
ceive as a lack of specificity regarding the content and scope of infor-
mation that must be provided. A number of commentators have
agreed with them.18 7 For example, court opinions addressing the issue
talk in terms of "reasonable disclosure of choices,"SS "material infor-
mation,"18 9 "material risks," 9 0 and "reasonable familiarity with the
therapeutic alternatives."19' This seeming lack of clarity may present
difficulties for the health care provider looking for a checklist solution
in order to cover all required points of information in the least possi-
ble time. It should be less troublesome when provider and patient
enter into an informed consent dialogue. Even the courts most
strongly favoring informed consent have been careful to say that the
physician need not discuss remote possibilities 92 unless, of course, the
patient requests that information. During informed consent discus-
sions the physician should be able to determine what information is
important to the patient and provide it. A patient who has a rudimen-
tary understanding of the diagnosis and the treatment alternatives,
who has confidence in the physician, and who, with the physician's
advice, has personally weighed the available alternatives, is far less
likely to sue later. 93
Another obstacle in the path of truly informed patient consent is
the widely held belief that most patients are incapable of grasping
either the diagnosis or treatment alternatives.94 If we assume this to
186. See, e.g., Andrews, supra note 165, at 182-204; Trichter, supra note 183, at 463;
Patient Participation, supra note 151, at 190-206. See also A. RosoFF, supra note
165, at 113-28.
187. Plant, The Decline of "Informed Consent", 35 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 91, 99-100
(1978); Note, Malpractice: Towards a Viable Disclosure Standard for Informed
Consent, 32 OKLA. L. REv. 868, 869 (1979); Patient Participation, supra note 151,
at 174-75. See also A. RosoFF, supra note 165, at 52.
188. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 786 (D.C. Cir.), cert denied, 409 U.S. 1064
(1972); Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 243, 502 P.2d 1, 10, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 514
(1972).
189. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 787 (D.C. Cir.), cert denied, 409 U.S. 1064
(1972); Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 245, 502 P.2d 1, 11, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 515
(1972).
190. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 787 (D.C. Cir.), cert denied, 409 U.S. 1064
(1972).
191. Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 243, 502 P.2d 1, 10, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 514 (1972).
192. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 787 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064
(1972); Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 244, 502 P.2d 1, 11, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 515
(1972).
193. Annas, supra note 71, at 11; Morrow, supra note 45, at 557; Trichter, supra note
183, at 463-64; Note, supra note 186, at 884.
194. Katz, supra note 164, at 148; McKinlay, Who Is Really Ignorant-Physician or
Patient?, 16 J. HEALTH & Soc. BEHAv. 3 (1975).
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be true, we may legitimately be concerned about decisions based on
misconstrued or misunderstood information. Although consistent
with the right of self-determination, misinformed decisions are likely
to be of poor quality and, consequently, against the best interests of
society which opts for maximization of individual health, other things
being equal.
Studies have shown this skepticism to be misplaced. 9 5 While this
issue has not been fully researched, those studies that have investi-
gated patient understanding of explanations of fairly complex medical
procedures generally have found good comprehension.196 Further-
more, through these studies researchers have identified ways in which
providers may better present information to best assure its compre-
hension.197 Heartened by these study results, physicians should now
feel that such explanations are an effective use of their time because,
again, the fully informed patient decisionmaker is less likely to sue.198
2. Informed Consent in Obstetrics
Informed consent is a factor in all kinds of medical treatment, but
it is of particular importance in the area of pregnancy and childbirth.
As discussed earlier, more and more women are rejecting the current
obstetrical standard of care and are demanding the right to make their
own decisions regarding their pregnancies and births.99 Increasingly,
women see childbirth as a intensely personal experience over which
they want control. They are willing to devote substantial amounts of
time to researching the process and the standard medical procedures
used by obstetricians in order to make intelligent decisions.20 0
Clearly, this is a departure from days not too far gone by when
women simply submitted to whatever their physicians proposed.201
This change has created tremendous friction between some pregnant
women and the physician community. Physicians are highly resistant
to giving up control of decisionmaking.202 Providing them with a
strong defense to claims of negligence in cases in which the pregnant
or birthing woman has opted to make her own choices would in part
resolve this tension and further the self-determination goal of the in-
formed consent doctrine.
195. For a discussion of the studies that have been undertaken, see Meisel & Roth,
Toward An Informed Discussion of Informed Consent A Review and Critique of
the Empirical Studies, 25 ARiz. L. REV. 263, 293 (1983).
196. Id. See also Andrews, supra note 165, at 180-204.
197. Epstein & Lasagna, Obtaining Informed Consent- Form or Substance, 123
ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 682 (1969).
198. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
199. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
200. Y. BRACKBILL, J. RICE & D. YOUNG, supra note 16, at 75.
201. B. KATZ ROTHmAN, supra note 22, at 29-30; Morrow, supra note 45, at 557-63.
202. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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3. Greater Assumption of Risk
To achieve this objective, it is proposed that courts and legislatures
adopt rules that give substantial control over practices and procedures
that might be used during pregnancy and childbirth to those women
who wish to exercise that control. In exchange for the woman's right
to decide, the physician must be given protection from claims of fail-
ure to meet the standard of care so long as it is proved that the wo-
man's choice and alternatives to it were fully discussed. In other
words, the pregnant woman must accept responsibility for her deci-
sions. Within this proposed framework, she should be found to have
assumed the risk, precluding liability for the physician in the absence
of negligent care.2 03
This proposition may be problematic because existing case law has
drawn a distinction between the assumption of medical and non-medi-
cal risks.204 A patient may assume non-medical risks (getting out of a
hospital bed resulting in an injury, for example), but generally courts
have not allowed this defense in cases involving medical risks.205 In
the latter case, it is believed that the patient cannot assume a risk that
he or she cannot understand due to the great complexity of medical
science.206 Therefore, the patient has the right to rely totally on the
physician's medical expertise and to be protected from his or her own
decisions. 207 As a consequence, in almost all jurisdictions, the assump-
tion of risk defense is unavailable to physicians who have shared deci-
sionmaking with patients only to be sued later.20S In order to give
birthing women authority in the childbirth process, courts and legisla-
tures must adopt a uniform rule for both medical and non-medical
risks. The assumption of the risk defense should be made available to
physicians to effectuate the right of the patient to make decisions and
to impose on the patient the concomitant duty to accept responsibility
for those decisions.
203. This idea has received support primarily in legal scholarship. See, e.g., Meisel,
supra note 103, at 128-29; Note, supra note 71, at 255-56. Thus far it has been
adopted by few courts. See Routt v. Ready, 265 F. 455 (D.C. Cir. 1920); Steele v.
Woods, 327 S.W.2d 187 (Mo. 1959); Mainfort v. Giannestras, 49 Ohio Op. 490, 111
N.E.2d 692 (Ohio Ct. App. 1951).
204. OBsTETRICs/GYNECoLOTY AND THE LAW, supra note 105, at 147.
205. I&
206. I& at 148.
207. Id.
208. Id- at 147. But see Mainfort v. Giannestra, 49 Ohio Op. 490, 111 N.E.2d 692 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1951) (physician who carefully and fully explained the risk due to pa-
tient's diabetic condition successfully asserted this defense). See also Routt v.




4. Right to Refuse Treatment
a. The General Rule
The patient's right to make decisions regarding medical treatment
has been given additional support through the existing right to refuse
treatment, certainly a necessary corollary of informed consent. If it is
to mean anything at all, the requirement of consent must, by implica-
tion at least, include the right to refuse to give consent.
A decision to refuse treatment clearly carries with it potentially
hazardous results. It should be noted, however, that in the name of
individual liberty, our society condones a variety of hazardous activi-
ties such as smoking tobacco, drinking alcohol, laboring in construc-
tion of buildings and bridges of enormous height, and mining minerals
underground. All of these activities involve great personal risks and
relatively little government interference. In the medical setting, in
contrast, there has been a greater effort to regulate action viewed as
hazardous to health; namely, refusing treatment advised by a physi-
cian. Yet in the cases in which this issue has been presented, courts
generally have upheld the right of the individual to decide against
treatment despite the pleas of physicians and hospitals.209
The great majority of the older cases involved persons whose reli-
gious convictions precluded treatment.21 0 More recently, because of
new life-sustaining technologies, courts have been asked to turn their
attention to whether the individual (or the individual's family) has a
right to refuse treatment that prolongs life in a clearly terminal
case.21 ' By and large, courts have found the individual's rights of self-
determination compelling,2 12 save in circumstances where they would
leave helpless dependents in the event of their demise.213 Thus, par-
ents on whose income children depend to survive were denied the
right to refuse blood transfusions.214 Where a parent made adequate
financial provision for dependents, however, the court declined to or-
der a transfusion and upheld his right of self-determination. 215
b. Refusal of Treatment in Obstetrics
A different case presents itself in the obstetrical setting where the
rights of more than one individual may be directly involved. In addi-
tion to the right of the individual to determine what will or will not
209. Annot., 93 A.L.R.3d 67 (1979); Annot., 9 A.L.R.3d 1391 (1966).
210. Annot., 9 A.L.R.3d 1391, 1393 (1966).
211. Annot., 79 A.L.R.3d 237 (1977).
212. See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
213. Annot., 9 A.L.R.3d 1391, 1393-94 (1966).
214. See, e.g., In re President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000
(D.C. Cir.), cert denied, 337 U.S. 978 (1964).
215. In re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372 (D.C. 1972).
[Vol. 65:655
BIRTHPLACE MALPRACTICE
happen to her body, consideration must be given to whether the fetus
has rights deserving protection. The rights of the fetus may impinge
upon the woman's right and may limit her ability to refuse treatment.
Court decisions involving pregnant women where the life of the
fetus is believed at risk have established such limitations. Since by its
very nature a fetus needs its mother's living body to survive, one court
ordered a blood transfusion for a pregnant woman.216 Another court,
convinced that the woman's refusal of treatment would likely result in
the death of the fetus, ordered her to submit to a cesarean section de-
livery.2 17 In those cases, the courts had to weigh the seemingly con-
flicting and yet inextricably intertwined interests of two individuals.
The societal value of preservation of life, when joined with the inter-
ests of the fetus in at least the potential for life, were held to outweigh
the woman's right of self-determination. 2 18 As a result, it is probably
unrealistic for advocates of the woman's right of self-determination to
expect courts to support a woman's decision in cases of this kind until,
through further technological change, the fetus is capable of surviving
outside the mother's body.
Courts should favor a more narrowly drawn right in circumstances
where fetal life is not at risk. A review of the relevant case law re-
vealed no cases where the court intervened to order treatment for a
pregnant woman in a situation not viewed as imminently life-threat-
ening to the fetus. In the future, court decisions regarding fetal rights
might present a serious impediment to a pregnant woman's right of
informed consent. At this juncture, however, it appears that courts
likely will respect the mother's judgment regarding the management
of her pregnancy, barring a situation which threatens the life of a pre-
sumed normal fetus. As these issues are presented in the future,
courts have strong precedent in the right-to-withdraw treatment and
defective newborn cases21 9 on which to rely to protect the medical
decisionmaking rights of the pregnant woman.
In this regard, a review of the court resolutions of related issues
such as abortion and the rights of parents vis-a-vis a seriously defec-
tive newborn is useful. The decisions in cases such as In re Quinlan22O
and the Baby Doe cases221 seem to favor parental rights and, by anal-
216. Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d
537, cert denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964).
217. Jefferson v. Griffin Spaulding County Hosp. Auth., 247 Ga. 86, 274 S.E.2d 457
(1981).
218. See supra cases cited at notes 215-16.
219. See infra notes 219-20 and accompanying text.
220. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976).
221. In re Infant Doe, No. GU8204-004A (Ind. Cir. Ct. Monroe County, Apr. 10, 1982)
(declaratory judgment). Because the records in this case were sealed by the Indi-
ana Supreme Court, the author relies upon interviews of the interested parties
reported in J. LYONS, PLAYING GOD IN THE NURSERY 30-33 (1985). See Weber v.
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ogy, offer support to pregnant and birthing women seeking self-deter-
mination. In these cases, parents received court approval of their
decisions to withdraw treatment222 and to withhold treatment in what
they viewed as hopeless situations.223
Absent a finding of abuse on the part of parents, many courts that
considered these issues held that it was safe to assume parental deci-
sions were in the children's best interests, particularly when sup-
ported by medical opinion.22 4 The right to privacy was also raised in
some of these court decisions. Generally courts have not found this
principle by itself to support the parents' right to decide.22 5
At the federal level, parental decisionmaking power has not been
restricted. The U.S. Supreme Court tread cautiously in this area in
the 1973 Roe v. Wade decision which found that, based on the right to
privacy, women have a right to seek an abortion.226 Indeed, an at-
tempt by the Reagan administration to usurp family decisionmaking
with the promulgation of the "Baby Doe Rules" has met with fail-
ure.227 Once a step down that road is taken, it is hard to imagine
where the line could be drawn. Shall pregnant women be subject to
criminal sanctions for smoking tobacco or drinking alcohol or working
in physically hazardous or high stress jobs? Thus far, the majority of
courts have wisely chosen to place their faith in parental judgment
and to support the integrity and privacy of the family.
c. One More Step to Patient Self-Determination
Taking the existing right of informed consent and the right to re-
Stony Brook Hosp., 95 A.D.2d 587, 467 N.Y.S.2d 685 (App. Div. 1983), alld, Weber
v. Stony Brook Hosp., 60 N.Y.2d 208, 456 N.E.2d 1186, 469 N.Y.S.2d 63 (1983).
222. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976). See also Annot., 79 A.L.R.3rd 237
(1977).
223. See supra note 220.
224. See, e.g., United States v. University Hosp., 575 F. Supp. 607, 614-15 (E.D.N.Y.
1983).
225. See, e.g., id at 615-16. But see In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 38-41, 355 A.2d 647, 663-64
(1976) (privacy interest begins to outweigh state interest in preservation of life
only as the degree of bodily invasion increases and hope for recovery dims);
Weber v. Stony Brook Hosp., 60 N.Y.2d 208, 213, 456 N.E.2d 1186, 1188, 469
N.Y.S.2d 63, 65 (1983) (circumstances may arise where the courts will be obligated
to intervene to challenge the private decision of a family in order to protect a
child).
226. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
227. The Reagan administration sought to force treatment of defective newborns
through the promulgation of administrative rules. The interim final rules were
struck down as arbitrary and capricious agency action. American Academy of
Pediatrics v. Heckler, 561 F. Supp. 395 (D.D.C. 1983). The revised and final regu-
lations were also struck down as being beyond the scope of the agency's statuto-
rily granted authority. American Hosp. Ass'n v. Heckler, 585 F. Supp. 541
(S.D.N.Y. 1984), qffd sub nam. United States v. University Hosp., 729 F.2d 144 (2d
Cir. 1984), afftd sub nom. Bowen v. American Hasp. Ass'n, 106 S. Ct. 2101 (1986).
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fuse treatment together, it can be seen that policymakers have moved
toward allowing a full-blown right of self-determination in the medi-
cal treatment arena. A patient has the right to be provided informa-
tion about the diagnosis and alternative treatments and their potential
outcomes228 and usually has the right to refuse any of the alternatives
presented.229 With only one more step, patients could be permitted to
take an active role in treatment selection, to enter into discussions re-
garding the alternatives presented by the attending physician and to
get the physician's opinion regarding other alternatives which may not
have been presented to the patient.
For example, a pregnant woman whose labor is prolonged might
decide to walk the hospital corridors or grounds for an hour to stimu-
late labor in lieu of the injection of a labor inducing hormone. Or a
patient with arteriosclerosis (clogged arteries) who has received infor-
mation about the risks of corrective surgery might decide to pursue a
conservative dietary treatment that requires self-discipline and a
longer period of time to achieve the desired results, but which entails
considerably less risk of immediate serious injury or death. These pa-
tient choices would be possible, and the physician would be protected
in the event that they lead to a poor outcome, only if the patient is
fully informed and works with the physician to select a treatment
plan.
The courts and legislatures already have taken a similar step in the
realm of consumer rights, and an analogy can be drawn between
choices of consumers of goods and services and consumers of health
care services. As noted earlier,230 the last thirty years have brought a
great burgeoning of consumer rights in the form of case precedents231
and statutes.2 32 Many of the rules in this area are designed to provide
consumers with sufficient information to enable them to make the
choices that are in their best interests as gauged by the consumers
themselves.233
The policies behind consumer rights should be expanded to include
the rights of health care consumers. To do so, the paternalism of the
present health care delivery system must be rejected and medical pa-
228. See supra notes 149-99 and accompanying text.
229. See supra notes 208-24 and accompanying text.
230. See supra notes 83-89 and accompanying text.
231. See supra notes 84-85.
232. See supra notes 86-89.
233. For example, the Truth in Lending Act requires that all lenders quote interest
rates in the form of an annual percentage rate so that consumers may comparison
shop for credit. 15 U.S.C. § 1631 (1982). Also, many provisions of the Michigan
Consumer Protection Act seek to eliminate false and misleading information
about goods and services so that consumers may make judgments based on accu-




tients given the right to make treatment decisions. If adequate infor-
mation has been made available, the individual, whether buying an
automobile or considering a tubal ligation, is surely in the best position
to understand the ramifications of the various alternatives. Even
though physicians normally have much more knowledge about the
medical implications of treatment alternatives, only the affected indi-
viduals can fully appreciate the impact that potential choices may
have on their lives.234 Admittedly, the complexities may be great
when dealing with medical problems. Still, these complexities should
not be permitted to justify the exclusion of the affected individual
from the decisionmaking process, if the goal is in fact the promotion of
self-determination and the protection of human dignity through in-
formed consent.235 Furthermore, patient self-determination should
lead to better medical outcomes236 and lower levels of malpractice
litigation.237
IV. CONCLUSION
Fearful of malpractice suits, physicians find their practices limited
by an increasingly restrictive, unproven standard of care that greatly
increases medical care costs. Policymakers tackling this multifaceted
problem should consider widening the geographical and hence the the-
oretical area of the standard of care. This widening will benefit pa-
tients and physicians by adding to the variety of alternative
treatments. In addition, physicians will have greater legal protection
under a broader standard. Review and alteration of unsubstantiated
doctor-established standards of care also could benefit obstetrical pa-
tients by protecting them from unproven and unnecessary procedures.
Moreover, it would also reduce pressure on physicians to intervene in
the childbirth process and would lower health care costs.
Wishing to regain control of the birth place, today more and more
women demand the right to a medically assisted birth and shared deci-
sionmaking instead of the current standard of medically managed
birth. In exchange for the right to make decisions about medical care,
women must be willing to accept responsibility for those decisions.
Physicians who relinquish or share decisionmaking authority with
pregnant (or, for that matter, any other) patients must be protected by
the assumption of the risk defense from claims alleging either failure
to provide full information or failure to follow a standard of care from
which the patient specifically requested that the physician deviate.
234. A. HOLDER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LAW 226 (2d ed. 1978); Morrow, supra note
45, at 576.
235. See supra notes 150-52 and accompanying text.
236. Andrews, supra note 165, at 165-68; Patient Participation, supra note 151, at 178-
82.
237. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
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Patients who know and trust their physician, who share in decision-
making and who know the possible results that lie ahead, are less
likely to sue when a competent medical effort has been made even
though the medical outcome is less than perfect.
